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TRAN v. MINNESOTA LIFE INSURANCE CO.
 What do Michael Hutchence,1 David Carradine,2 and Kevin Gilbert3 have in 
common? All three of these celebrities were found dead under circumstances 
resembling suicide.4 However, they were most likely victims of autoerotic 
asphyxiation.5 In the United States alone, this sexual practice is estimated to kill 
between 250 and twelve hundred people every year.6 Often mistaken for suicide, 
autoerotic asphyxiation constitutes an act far different from “intentionally taking 
one’s own life.”7
 Autoerotic asphyxiation is a sexual practice whereby a person limits blood flow to 
the brain during sexual self-stimulation in order to incite a feeling of euphoria.8 This 
is usually done by applying pressure on neck arteries, using a rope or other ligature.9 
The resulting hypoxia10 and hypercapnia11 intensify the pleasure associated with the 
1. Michael Hutchence was an Australian singer and member of the band INXS, found dead at the age of 
thirty-seven in a Sydney hotel room in November 1997. Celebrities and Fans Share Hutchence Family 
Grief, BBC News (Nov. 27, 1997, 10:13 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/34997.stm.
2. David Carradine, an American actor known primarily for his role in the 1970s television series Kung Fu 
and for portraying the title character in Quentin Tarantino’s Kill Bill Volumes I and II, was found dead at 
the age of seventy-two in a Bangkok hotel room in June 2009. Bruce Weber, David Carradine, Actor, Is 
Dead at 72, N.Y. Times (June 4, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/movies/05carradine.html.
3. Kevin Gilbert, an American musician best known for co-authoring the 1993 Tuesday Night Music Club 
debut album by Sheryl Crow, was found dead in his living room at the age of twenty-nine in September 
1996. Joel Selvin, More Than ‘The Piano Player’, S.F. Chronicle: SFGate (Sept. 15, 1996, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/More-Than-The-Piano-Player-Dumped-by-Sheryl-2966770.php.
4. See Michael Hutchence Death Explained: The Coroner’s Account in His Own Words, Herald Sun (Jan. 29, 
2014, 4:38 PM), https://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/michael-hutchence-death-explained-
the-coroners-account-in-his-own-words/news-story/26dae2274fadfcbb10beb994f7cf7d26 (“Hutchence 
was found at 11:50am, naked behind the door to his room. He had apparently hanged himself with his 
own belt and the buckle broke away and his body was found kneeling on the f loor and facing the door.”); 
Selvin, supra note 3 (“A black hood covered his face. He wore a black skirt. His head was slumped 
against a leather strap chained to the headboard of the king-size bed in the sparsely furnished living 
room.”); Weber, supra note 2 (quoting a police officer investigating the death, Teerapop Luanseng) (“I 
can confirm that we found his body, naked, hanging in the closet.”).
5. See Entertainment Paula Challenges Hutchence Verdict, BBC News (Aug. 10, 1999, 15:18 GMT), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/416509.stm (“The . . . coroner recorded a suicide but many believe 
Hutchence has been involved in a fatal sex act.”); Brian Orloff, David Carradine Died of Accidental 
Asphyxiation, People (Jul. 2, 2009, 3:40 PM), https://people.com/celebrity/david-carradine-died-of-
accidental-asphyxiation/ (“The actor died from accidental asphyxiation, a medical examiner who 
performed a private autopsy on the actor has concluded.”); Selvin, supra note 3 (“The Los Angeles 
County coroner’s office sees four or five such deaths a year–‘autoerotic asphyxiation.’”).
6. Daniel D. Cowell, Autoerotic Asphyxiation: Secret Pleasure—Lethal Outcome?, 124 Pediatrics 1319, 
1320 (2009).
7. Askar Mehdi et al., Distinguishing Suicidal Attempt from Autoerotic Asphyxiation, 45 Psychiatric 
Annals 285, 286 (2015) (defining suicide as “the act of intentionally taking one’s own life.”).
8. Gary Schuman, Fatal Attraction: Autoeroticism and Accidental Death Insurance Coverage, 49 Tort Trial 
& Ins. Prac. L.J. 667, 669 (2014).
9. Id.
10. Hypoxia is a condition characterized by a decreased oxygen level in the blood. Id.
11. Hypercapnia is a condition characterized by an increased carbon dioxide level in the blood. Id.
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accompanying orgasm.12 The American Psychiatric Association defines autoerotic 
asphyxiation as a subset of sexual masochism disorder.13
 Unlike a suicide by hanging, a death from autoerotic asphyxiation generally offers 
evidence of: (1) no recent stressor; (2) no history of suicidal thoughts or attempts; (3) 
no significant anxiety, depression, or other psychotic symptoms; (4) the use of safety 
precautions and self-escape mechanisms; (5) a history of other autoerotic behaviors; 
and (6) causation by a solo sexual act.14
 In 2019, in Tran v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co., the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals had to determine whether death from autoerotic asphyxiation constitutes an 
accidental death that entitles the victim’s beneficiaries to an accidental death 
insurance payment.15 The court held that death by autoerotic asphyxiation is an 
intentionally self-inflicted injury and denied the insurance payment to the victim’s 
spouse.16 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the layperson understanding 
test, and reasoned that because a layperson would commonly view strangling oneself 
as an injury, the victim’s act of strangling himself for autoerotic asphyxiation purposes 
was, therefore, an injury.17 Further, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined 
that, because the victim deliberately engaged in autoerotic asphyxiation, his injury 
must have been intentionally self-inflicted.18
 This Case Comment contends that the Tran court erred in finding that the 
victim’s death was intentional because the court misapplied the subjective/objective 
test as defined in binding Seventh Circuit precedent.19 First, in considering the 
subjective prong of the test, the Tran court asked whether the “injured individual had 
a subjective expectation of injuring himself,”20 and not whether the “deceased had a 
12. Id. Most individuals engaging in autoerotic asphyxiation retain their senses, relieve pressure to their 
arteries in a timely fashion, and suffer no permanent injuries. Id. However, on rare occasions, 
practitioners may die as a result of strangulation due to unconsciousness before timely pressure relief or 
equipment malfunction. Id. at 670.
13. See Tran v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 922 F.3d 380, 381 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that autoerotic 
asphyxiation is a subset of sexual masochism disorder according to the American Psychiatric 
Association’s definition in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of Mental Disorders). In the 
DSM, there is a section that discusses sexual masochism disorder, which is defined as “sexual arousal 
from the act of being humiliated, beaten, bound, or otherwise made to suffer.” Id. at 385 (emphasis 
omitted).
14. Mehdi et. al., supra note 7, at 288.
15. 922 F.3d at 381.
16. Id. at 386.
17. Id. at 383–85.
18. Id. at 385–86.
19. Compare id. (applying the layperson understanding test and holding that death by autoerotic asphyxiation 
does not constitute an accidental death under decedent’s life insurance policy), with Santaella v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 
(5th Cir. 1995)) (adopting the subjective/objective test to determine whether a death is accidental under 
a life insurance policy).
20. Tran, 922 F.3d at 385.
12
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subjective expectation of survival,” thus misapplying the precedent.21 Second, since 
the Tran court should have found that the subjective prong of the test was met, the 
court was then required to consider whether the victim’s subjective expectation of 
survival was objectively reasonable.22 This misapplication of the subjective/objective 
test led to an erroneous result that confuses accidental death caused by autoerotic 
asphyxiation with an intentional suicide. The Tran court, by rejecting the spouse’s 
claim for the accidental death insurance proceeds, contributed to an existing circuit 
split23 and invalidated the very purpose of that insurance—to protect insureds from 
fatal mistakes.
 In August 2016, Linno Llenos was alone in his Wilmette, Illinois home when he 
went down to his basement, hung a noose from a ceiling beam, stood on a stool, tied 
the noose around his neck, stepped off the stool, and died.24 His wife, the plaintiff, 
Letran Tran, found his body when she returned home and immediately called the 
police, who reported the death as a suicide.25
 Further inquiry revealed that Llenos had not been suicidal and that his family’s 
finances were secure.26 More importantly, police reports noted that Llenos took 
21. See Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing decedent’s expectation 
of survival when he performed autoerotic asphyxiation); see also Santaella, 123 F.3d at 463 (discussing 
decedent’s expectation of survival when she took a dose of pain medication prescribed by a doctor); see 
also Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456 (discussing decedent’s expectation of survival when he performed autoerotic 
asphyxiation).
22. See Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 260 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing 
decedent’s objectively reasonable expectation of survival when he died from autoerotic asphyxiation); see 
also Santaella, 123 F.3d at 463 (quoting Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456) (applying the objective prong of the 
subjective/objective test when decedent died from taking a dose of pain medication prescribed by a 
doctor); see also Todd, 47 F.2d at 1456 (articulating the objective prong of the subjective/objective test 
and applying it to an autoerotic asphyxiation case).
23. The Seventh Circuit with its Circuit Rule 40(e) “follows a less rigid stare decisis rule, allowing one panel 
to overrule another . . . .” See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 
Nev. L.J. 787, 794 (2012); see also 7th Cir. R. 40(e) (“A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court 
adopting a position which would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a conflict between or 
among circuits shall not be published unless it is first circulated among the active members of this court 
and a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the issue of whether the position should be 
adopted.”). Notably, the Tran court acknowledged the circuit split it created “with the Second Circuit in 
Critchlow and the Ninth Circuit in Padfield,” explaining that it circulated the opinion under Circuit Rule 
40(e) among judges of the court and that majority of the judges “did not favor rehearing the case en banc 
on the question of creating a conflict” with the Second and Ninth Circuits. Tran, 922 F.3d at 386 n.5. 
However, as this Case Comment argues, the Tran court also misapplied its own precedent, found in 
Santaella, which the court did not acknowledge for the purposes of stare decisis and Circuit Rule 40(e).
24. Tran, 922 F.3d at 381.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 388 (Bauer, J., dissenting). Economic strain, which includes unemployment or economic loss, is 
often linked to suicide risk. Deb Stone et al., Preventing Suicide: A Technical Package of Policy, Programs, 
and Practices 15 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicideTechnicalPackage.pdf. On 
the other hand, economic strain is not a factor related to autoerotic asphyxiation. See Mehdi et. al., supra 
note 7, at 288.
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prophylactic27 measures to eliminate the risk of injury, including placing a towel 
around his neck, resting his foot on a stool, and adding a possible release mechanism 
to the noose.28 Additionally, the medical examiner found sexual paraphernalia29 on 
Llenos’s body as well as rubber rings placed around his genitals, and observed that 
his pubic hair was shaved in a semi-circular pattern, consistent with prior use of 
these rings.30 The record seemed to indicate that Llenos had a non-injurious history 
of autoerotic asphyxiation; the medical examiner ultimately concluded that autoerotic 
asphyxiation was the cause of death.31
 Following her husband’s death, Tran filed a claim with Minnesota Life Insurance 
Company.32 Llenos was covered by two life insurance policies—Basic and 
Supplemental—providing $517,000 in combined coverage.33 Each policy also 
included Accidental Death & Dismemberment (AD&D) policy riders,34 which 
provided an additional $60,000 in combined coverage that could only be received 
following an accidental death.35
 Tran received $517,000 under the Basic and Supplemental policies.36 However, 
Minnesota Life denied Tran’s claim for the additional $60,000 in AD&D coverage, 
concluding that Llenos’s death was not accidental.37 In support of this position, 
Minnesota Life pointed to the exclusion for intentionally self-inf licted injuries, 
which states:
In no event will we pay the accidental death or dismemberment benefit where 
an insured’s death or dismemberment results from or is caused directly by any 
27. The term “prophylactic” is defined as “designed or intended to prevent or stop something harmful or 
undesirable; preventative.” Prophylactic, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
28. Tran, 922 F.3d at 388 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
29. The term “sex paraphernalia” is commonly defined as “any inedible lubricant which is manufactured, 
promoted or designed to be used primarily for sexual stimulation, sexual arousal, or the enhancing or 
prolonging of sexual activity.” Sex Paraphernalia, Lawinsider.com, https://www.lawinsider.com/
dictionary/sex-paraphernalia (last visited Jan. 26, 2021).
30. Tran, 922 F.3d at 388 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 381, 388.
32. Id. at 382 (majorty opinion).
33. Id. at 381.
34. An insurance policy rider is typically “an added provision to an insurance policy, such as additional 
coverage or temporary insurance to cover a public event.” Rider, Law.com, https://dictionary.law.com/
Default.aspx?selected=1856 (last visited Jan. 26, 2021).
35. Tran, 922 F.3d at 381–82. “Accidental death or dismemberment by accidental injury as used in this rider 
means that the insured’s death or dismemberment results, directly and independently of disease or 
bodily infirmity, from an accidental injury which is unexpected and unforeseen.” Tran v. Minn. Life 
Ins. Co., No. 17-cv-450, 2018 WL 1156326, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018).
36. Tran, 922 F.3d at 381–82.
37. Id. at 382.
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of the following: . . . intentionally self-inflicted injury or any attempt at self-
inflicted injury, whether sane or insane . . . .38
Tran filed an internal appeal39 at Minnesota Life, which was denied.40
 Subsequently, Tran brought this action under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA),41 in order to recover the AD&D coverage payout.42 The 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, concluded that 
Minnesota Life had conceded that the death was accidental, thus leaving only one 
issue in dispute: whether autoerotic asphyxiation constitutes an “injury” as understood 
by the insurance policy language.43
 Since Tran brought this action under ERISA, federal common law applies and, 
accordingly, all policy ambiguities must be construed in favor of insurance coverage.44 
Relying on precedent from other circuits,45 the district court found that reasonable 
minds could disagree about whether Llenos’s autoerotic asphyxiation was a self-
inflicted injury within the policy language and ruled in favor of Tran.46
 Minnesota Life then filed an appeal, which was decided by the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals on April 29, 2019.47 The court of appeals shifted the focus of the 
38. Id. (emphasis omitted).
39. In the insurance context, internal appeal is defined as “a review by an insurer of an adverse benefit 
determination made” by the insurer. Internal Appeal, Lawinsider.com, https://www.lawinsider.com/
dictionary/internal-appeal (last visited Jan. 26, 2021).
40. Tran, 922 F.3d at 382. On appeal, Tran claimed that Llenos did not commit or attempt suicide or self-
inf licted injury, but that he engaged in a pleasurable activity resulting in an unfortunate accident, which 
should not prevent the accidental death insurance payment. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Letran Tran at 
6, Tran v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 922 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1723), 2018 WL 3729436. Tran 
compared autoerotic asphyxiation to enjoyable activities such as skydiving, motorcycle riding, or sailing, 
stating that these pastimes may also result in death in the event of accident. Minnesota Life argued that 
without any new medical information from the plaintiff, and based on the insurance policy terms, it 
must affirm the denial. Id.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is a 
“federal law that sets minimum standards for most voluntarily established retirement and health plans 
in private industry to provide protection for individuals in these plans.” Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), U.S. Dep’t of Lab., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement/erisa#targetText 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2021). Llenos’s insurance policy with Minnesota Life was governed by ERISA. 
Tran, 922 F.3d at 381.
42. Tran v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., No. 17-cv-450, 2018 WL 1156326, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018), vacated, 
922 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2019).
43. Id. at *6.
44. Id.
45. See Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that decedent’s death was 
accidental because he had a subjective expectation of surviving the autoerotic asphyxiation act); see also 
Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456) 
(“We agree with the court’s holding in Todd: . . . ‘the likelihood of death from autoerotic activity falls 
short of what would be required to negate coverage’ under an accidental death policy.”).
46. Tran, 2018 WL 1156326, at *10.
47. Tran v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 922 F.3d 380, 380 (7th Cir. 2019).
15
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analysis, stating that even an accidental death may be excluded from coverage under 
this particular insurance policy if it resulted from an intentionally self-inf licted 
injury.48 Thus, in order to determine whether Llenos’s death should be excluded from 
coverage, the court examined whether: (1) autoerotic asphyxiation constitutes an 
“injury” and (2) Llenos’s injury was intentionally self-inflicted.49
 Accident insurance dates back to mid-nineteenth-century London, when early 
railroad accidents became a public concern.50 In 1849, the Railway Passengers 
Assurance Company opened its doors and established the first accident insurance 
policy.51 This allowed railroad passengers to purchase insurance for their trips which 
would provide relief if insureds suffered injuries as a result of a railway accident.52 In 
1850, the Accidental Death Insurance Company was founded, extending the scope 
of coverage beyond railroad accidents, to include all types of injuries, and offering 
affordable insurance to a greater number of people.53
 In the 1860s, accident insurance debuted in the United States with the formation 
of the Travelers Insurance Company.54 As competition in the insurance market 
increased and companies vied for customers, U.S. insurers developed accidental death 
insurance.55
 The emergence of accident insurance created a new issue in legal jurisprudence—
how to define “accident.”56 Early courts generally followed one of two distinct 
approaches: (1) the “accidental means” analysis or (2) the “common speech of man” 
analysis.57 The “accidental means” approach barred recovery of accidental death 
48. Id. at 382.
49. Id.
50. See Gabriel Burnham, Note, What Does Accidental Mean?: Autoerotic Asphyxiation as an Illustration of the 
Problems Affecting Accident Insurance, 13 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 607, 609 (2007) (“Technology and 
the unsatisfactory state of tort law compelled the development of accident insurance in mid-nineteenth 
century London, when railroads were still in the early stages of development and imperfections often 
led to accidents. These accidents were widely reported in local newspapers like the London Times and 
caused a great deal of public anxiety.”). Meanwhile, the codification of tort law in the Fatal Accidents 
Act also created public anxiety because recovery in accidental cases was conditioned on monetary loss, 
thus allowing the wealthy to recover, while leaving the poor with nothing. Id. at 610.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 611.
54. Id.
55. Id. This accidental death insurance usually appeared as a double indemnity clause in life insurance 
policies. “Double indemnity clauses allowed the families of the insured to collect double the base 
amount . . . under the policy if death occurred as a result of an accident.” Id. “[A]ccident insurance 
gradually changed from an instrument to protect train passengers to bonus coverage . . . sold to life 
insurance customers in the form of a double indemnity.” Id. at 611–12.
56. Id. at 612.
57. Id.
16
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insurance if the decedent voluntarily undertook the activity that led to their death.58 
The “common speech of man” approach called for a case-by-case analysis to 
determine whether “the accident resulting in death was an accident according to the 
‘common speech of man’” and, if it was, allowed recovery.59
 In 1934, a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision, Landress v. Phoenix Mutual 
Life Insurance Co., followed the “accidental means” approach, and denied recovery to 
a man who died from sunstroke because, the Court reasoned, he voluntarily exposed 
himself to the sun while golfing.60 This opinion, however, was frequently frowned 
upon by courts,61 which often preferred the “common speech of man” approach62 
outlined in Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s dissent.63
 In applying these principles to autoerotic asphyxiation cases, courts have come to 
“erratic results.”64 In Runge v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a 1976 decision, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the “accidental means” approach and found 
an autoerotic asphyxiation death non-accidental because the decedent deliberately 
engaged in it.65 But in 1994, in Parker v. Danaher Corp., the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Arkansas applied the “common speech of man” approach and 
58. See id. (“Courts that utilized [the] ‘accidental means’ analysis looked to the actions of the deceased: if 
the deceased voluntarily engaged in an activity that lead to their death, the recovery would be barred.”); 
see also Sam Erman, Note, Word Games: Raising and Resolving the Shortcomings in Accident-Insurance 
Doctrine That Autoerotic-Asphyxiation Cases Reveal, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2172, 2195–96 (2005) (“To 
distinguish, courts have reasoned that mishaps or involuntary, unintentional action that lead to 
unforeseen deaths and injuries—like stumbling while descending from a platform—qualify [for 
insurance payment], but voluntary actions that turn out badly—like russian roulette—do not.”).
59. Burnham, supra note 50, at 612.
60. 291 U.S. 491, 495–96 (1934) (“The stipulated payments are to be made only if the bodily injury, though 
unforeseen, is effected by means which are external and accidental. The external means is stated to be 
the rays of the sun, to which the insured voluntarily exposed himself.”); Burnham, supra note 50, at 613 
(explaining that the Landress court applied the accidental means analysis to deny payment to the 
insured’s family in a stunstroke case).
61. See Burnham, supra note 50, at 613–14 (describing the Landress opinion as unpopular and receiving a 
“lack of esteem”); see also Erman, supra note 58, at 2196 (“Accidental-means analysis has proven 
unworkable and has been inconsistently applied. In some cases courts have been unable to locate the line 
between means and results, and where courts have applied the test, they have produced obscurely argued 
and conflicting opinions.”).
62. Burnham, supra note 50, at 615 (“The sunstroke cases illustrate the reluctance of courts to adopt the 
accidental means analysis . . . used by the Supreme Court in Landress. Instead, subsequent courts have 
adopted reasoning similar to . . . [the] ‘common speech of man’ test . . . suggested [by the dissent] in 
Landress.”).
63. Landress, 291 U.S. at 498–501 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (arguing that sunstroke is an accident in the 
common speech of men and criticizing the majority’s reasoning).
64. See Burnham, supra note 50, at 618 (“Despite the general unpopularity of [the] ‘accidental means’ 
analysis, some jurisdictions continue to apply it . . . . The result has been erratic decisions that vary by 
jurisdiction.”); see also Erman, supra note 58, at 2199 (discussing that courts reach different results in 
determining whether autoerotic asphyxiation constitutes an accidental or intentional death with respect 
to life insurance coverage).
65. 537 F.2d 1157, 1159 (4th Cir. 1976); Burnham, supra note 50, at 619–20.
17
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found an autoerotic asphyxiation death accidental because that is how a common 
person would understand it.66 These two cases exemplify the “general confusion 
surrounding accident insurance claims involving autoerotic asphyxiation.”67
 Whether autoerotic asphyxiation constitutes an injury that is intentionally self-
inflicted and precludes accidental death insurance payments remains an issue that 
splits courts.68 Currently, many federal courts follow a subjective/objective test that 
was first applied in a deathly-fall case, Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance 
Co.,69 rather than the “accidental means” or “common speech of man” tests, to 
determine whether an injury from autoerotic asphyxiation is intentionally self-
inflicted.70 This test requires a court to determine whether the deathly result “was 
actually expected by the insured” and, if not, “whether the insured’s expectations 
were reasonable” from an objective standpoint.71
 The Seventh Circuit adopted a version of this test in 1997 in Santaella v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a case involving an accidental overdose of prescription 
pain medication.72 In Santaella, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals quoted the 
Fifth Circuit’s methodology for determining whether a death is accidental:
[F]or death under an accidental death policy to be deemed an accident, it 
must be determined (1) that the deceased had a subjective expectation of 
survival, and (2) that such expectation was objectively reasonable, which it is 
if death is not substantially certain to result from the insured’s conduct.73
In Santaella, the decedent died from an overdose of a drug whose therapeutic and 
toxic dosages were so similar that accidents were common.74 The court allowed 
66. 851 F. Supp. 1287, 1295 (W.D. Ark. 1994); Burnham, supra note 50, at 618–19.
67. Burnham, supra note 50, at 620.
68. Compare Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 264 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding 
that death from autoerotic asphyxiation is accidental and rejecting denial of insurance proceeds), with 
Sims v. Monumental Gen. Ins. Co., 960 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that death from 
autoerotic asphyxiation results from an intentionally self-inf licted injury and thus denying insurance 
proceeds); see also Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Recovery on Insurance Policy When Death Occurs by 
Autoerotic Asphyxiation, 51 A.L.R.6th 495 (2010) (“The courts are about evenly divided on whether 
recovery is allowed when death results from autoerotic strangulation.”).
69. 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990).
70. Schuman, supra note 8, at 678.
71. Id. at 678–79; accord Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1088 (“[T]he reasonable expectations of the insured when 
the policy was purchased is the proper starting point . . . . If the fact-finder determines that the insured 
did not expect an injury similar in type or kind to that suffered, the fact-finder must then examine 
whether the suppositions . . . underlay[ing] that expectation were reasonable.”).
72. 123 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1997).
73. Id. at 463 (alteration in original) (quoting Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 
1995)).
74. Id. at 459. “[P]ropoxyphene has been associated very commonly with accidental drug overdoses because 
there is a very small margin of safety in propoxyphene. The margin between a therapeutic dose and a 
toxic or lethal dose is smaller than many other drugs.” Id. (citing the deposition of the medical examiner 
who performed the autopsy on decedent).
18
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recovery, finding that there was no evidence that the decedent was aware of the risk 
of death or injury.75
 In 2019, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its first opinion concerning 
autoerotic asphyxiation in Tran v. Minnesota Life Ins. Co.76 Tran argued that under 
the subjective/objective test, adopted in Santaella, she was entitled to an accidental 
death insurance payment for two reasons.77 First, Llenos had a subjective expectation 
of sexual gratification and not of injury, and evidence showed that he had engaged in 
this activity in the past and survived.78 Second, Llenos’s subjective expectation was 
objectively reasonable because he had set up protective measures.79 Therefore, 
Llenos’s death was due to an “accidental injury,” and should have been covered by the 
accidental death insurance policy.80
 Minnesota Life disagreed and argued that: (1) the district court erred by equating 
Llenos’s unintentional death with an accidental injury and automatically assuming 
coverage;81 (2) Llenos subjectively intended to shut down his vital functions, which 
an objectively reasonable person would perceive as carrying a substantial risk of 
injury or death;82 and (3) the district court failed to make findings of fact necessary 
to determine whether the exclusion for intentionally self-inflicted injuries applied.83
 On April 29, 2019, the Tran court held that Llenos died from an intentionally 
self-inf licted injury, and, therefore, his wife was not entitled to the $60,000 of 
AD&D insurance coverage.84 In the first phase of its analysis, the Tran court 
inquired whether autoerotic asphyxiation is an injury and thus falls under the 
75. Id. at 465.
76. 922 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2019). In a common law system, a case of first impression is significant because 
it presents a novel issue the court has not seen before, in which the court must use persuasive authority 
or other analytical tools to answer the question before it; its answer, in turn, becomes part of the judicial 
precedent. See David S. Coale & Jeaneen M. Dyrek, First Impressions, 24 App. Advoc. 274, 274 (2011) 
(discussing the meaning of a case of first impression).
77. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Letran Tran, supra note 40, at *20.
78. Id.
79. Id. Protective measures included a towel, a step stool, and a release mechanism with a rope. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Minnesota Life Insurance Co. at 18–19, Tran v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 
922 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1723), 2018 WL 3237576 (“The district court’s [o]pinion was 
tainted by three fundamental legal errors. First, the district court confused unintended death with 
accidental injury. Minnesota Life acknowledged that Llenos’s death was not a suicide. The district court 
misconstrued this as an admission that Llenos’s death was accidental . . . .”).
82. Id. at 32.
83. Id. at 37. The findings of fact mentioned by Minnesota Life related to the effect that hanging had on 
Llenos’s body, including “compression of his trachea to halt breathing and deprive his brain of oxygen 
while increasing carbon dioxide levels, compression of the arteries of his neck to raise the blood pressure 
in his head, and the sudden drop in blood pressure to create a head-rush.” Id. at 38.
84. Tran v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 922 F.3d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 2019).
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insurance policy’s exclusion for “intentionally self-inf licted injuries.”85 The Tran 
court reasoned that strangulation is an injury because “an ordinary person would 
consider choking oneself by hanging from a noose to be an injury, even if that 
strangulation is only ‘partial.’”86 The Tran court focused on causation and found that 
because there was no intervening cause of death, Llenos was “injured” and killed by 
autoerotic asphyxiation and the resulting hypoxia.87
 The Tran court, having determined that the autoerotic asphyxiation was an injury, 
then moved on to the second phase of its analysis—determining whether the injury 
was “intentionally self-inflicted.”88 In order to establish whether the injury was self-
inflicted within the meaning of the insurance policy exclusion, the Tran court applied 
the subjective/objective test from Santaella.89 The court found that “the injured 
individual had a subjective expectation of injuring himself ” because autoerotic 
asphyxiation is an injury and Llenos intentionally engaged in it.90 Because Llenos’s 
subjective intent to engage in the activity was clear, the court did not proceed to the 
second phase of the analysis—the objective stage.91 The court reasoned that, because 
autoerotic asphyxiation is an injury and Llenos intentionally engaged in it, his death 
fell under the insurance policy exclusion for intentionally self-inflicted injuries.92
 The dissenting opinion emphasized, as the lower court had, that insurance plan 
ambiguities must be resolved in favor of coverage, and that it would be reasonable to 
conclude that Llenos’s death was not intentional but instead, an accident.93 Therefore, 
the dissent found that Llenos’s death was an “unexpected and unforeseen accident” 
that warranted the $60,000 AD&D insurance payment.94
 Regardless of whether autoerotic asphyxiation is an injury, the Tran court erred 
in the second phase of its analysis. First, the Tran court erred in its application of the 
subjective prong of the subjective/objective test because it inquired whether Llenos 
85. Id. at 382 (“To determine whether Llenos’s death is excluded from AD&D coverage, we must determine 
first whether autoerotic asphyxiation is an ‘injury,’ and second, whether that injury was ‘intentionally 
self-inf licted.’”).
86. Id. at 384. The Tran court did not find the popularity of autoerotic asphyxiation or its sexual nature to 
be relevant. Id. at 384–85.
87. Id. at 384 (first citing Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2002); and then 
citing Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2004)) (“[In those 
cases], there was no intervening cause, and no break in the chain of causation: one act of autoerotic 
asphyxiation caused the hypoxia that killed them. The same reasoning applies here . . . .”).
88. Id. at 385–86.
89. Id. at 385.
90. Id. at 385–86.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 386–88 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 386–87. The dissent argued that the majority wrongly divides the activity into two separate acts: 
(1) the act of masturbation and (2) the act of self-strangulation. Id. at 387. This confused the analysis 
because it erroneously divided one process into two separate acts, with the majority focusing solely on 
the strangulation aspect. Id.
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had a subjective expectation of injuring himself.95 The correct test, however, asks 
whether Llenos had a subjective expectation of survival.96
 In Santaella, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted in 1997 the following 
version of the subjective prong of the subjective/objective test: “[F]or death under an 
accidental death policy to be deemed an accident, it must be determined . . . that the 
deceased had a subjective expectation of survival.”97 Thus, the decedent in Santaella, 
who voluntarily took an overdose of a prescription drug and died as a result, was 
nevertheless found to have a subjective expectation of survival, because nothing in the 
record indicated that she “intended to take an overdose or . . . inflict injury on herself.”98
 Likewise, in 2002, in Padfield v. AIG Life Insurance Co., the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals found that death as a result of autoerotic asphyxiation was an accident 
because the decedent had an expectation of survival.99 This was especially true 
because the decedent had performed autoerotic asphyxiation in the past without any 
injuries, and thus had an expectation of doing so again.100 The Padfield court 
analogized to Santaella, finding that the decedent died not from an intentionally 
self-inflicted injury, but from a fatal mistake.101
 Similarly, in Todd v. AIG Life Insurance Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
1995 formulated the famously quoted language for the analysis of the subjective 
prong of the subjective/objective test that the Seventh Circuit adopted in Santaella 
two years later.102 The Todd court found that, where the decedent had previously 
engaged in autoerotic asphyxiation without dying, was happily married, had plans for 
a family vacation, and was building a new house, he had a subjective expectation of 
surviving his autoerotic asphyxiation act.103
 The Tran court erred in its application of the subjective prong of the subjective/
objective test because it asked whether Llenos had an expectation of injuring himself 
instead of asking whether he had an expectation of survival.104 As a result, the Tran 
95. Id. at 385.
96. Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 1997).
97. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995)).
98. Id. at 464–65.
99. 290 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002).
100. Id. at 1130.
101. Id. (citing Santaella, 123 F.3d at 465). The Padfield court emphasized that a voluntary and risky act that 
results in an injury, like autoerotic asphyxiation, is not necessarily an act that results in an intentionally 
self-inflicted injury, especially if decedent engaged in the act in the past with no injuries. Id. at 1129.
102. 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995); see Santaella, 123 F.3d at 463 (“[F]or death under an accidental death 
policy to be deemed an accident, it must be determined (1) that the deceased had a subjective expectation 
of survival.”).
103. Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456.
104. See Tran v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 922 F.3d 380, 385–86 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e examine whether the 
injured individual had a subjective expectation of injuring himself . . . . [L]lenos’s subjective intent was 
clear. Llenos intentionally performed autoerotic asphyxiation. Because the act itself is an injury, Llenos’s 
death falls under the policy exclusion for intentionally self-inf licted injuries.”).
21
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 65 | 2020/21
court failed to consider a wealth of evidence indicating that Llenos had no intention 
of dying.105 Just like the decedents in Padfield and Todd, Llenos had a history of non-
injurious autoerotic asphyxiation, had both a secure family life and finances, was not 
suicidal, and used prophylactic measures to mitigate the risk of injury or death.106
 Llenos was certainly aware that some sort of an injury could result from this act; 
he would not have taken any precautionary measures otherwise.107 His precautionary 
measures were precisely intended to mitigate this risk of injury, prompting Llenos to 
believe that he would survive this act.108 This belief was further reinforced because 
Llenos had a non-injurious history of autoerotic asphyxiation.109
 The Tran court, however, inquired about Llenos’s expectation of injury, not his 
expectation of survival.110 Therefore, the court found that Llenos intentionally 
inflicted an injury upon himself.111 Had the court applied the correct standard for 
the subjective prong of the subjective/objective test, it would have found that Llenos 
subjectively expected to survive, because he had a history of non-injurious autoerotic 
asphyxiation and safety measures in place.112
 Next, since the Tran court should have found that the first prong of the subjective/
objective test was met, the court should have then considered whether Llenos’s 
subjective expectation of survival was objectively reasonable.113 A court must consider 
both the subjective expectations of the insured and the objective reasonableness of 
these expectations when evaluating insurance proceeds for an accidental death.114 
The Santaella court explicitly states that, when inquiring into whether death 
105. See id. at 388 (Bauer, J. dissenting) (“Here, there is evidence that Llenos intended to weather the 
masturbatory episode unscathed.”).
106. Id. Prophylactic measures included placing a towel around the neck and a release mechanism. Id.
107. See Burnham, supra note 50, at 607 (“[M]ost people who engage in this activity install some safety 
measures to ensure continued existence.”).
108. See id. (“Far from being suicidal, those who practice autoerotic asphyxiation intend to survive the 
experience.”); see also Douglas R. Richmond, Drugs, Sex, and Accidental Death Insurance, 45 Tort Trial 
& Ins. Prac. L.J. 57, 59 (2009) (“The vast majority of people who engage in activities with any measure 
of physical risk believe that they have those risks under control.”).
109. Tran, 922 F.3d at 388 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 385 (majority opinion) (“[W]e examine whether the injured individual had a subjective 
expectation of injuring himself . . . .”).
111. Id. at 386.
112. See id. at 388 (Bauer, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is evidence that Llenos intended to weather the 
masturbatory episode unscathed . . . . [T]here were prophylactic measures in place to mitigate the risk of 
injury . . . . [L]lenos had a history of engaging in autoerotic asphyxiation and doing so without injury, 
leading one to the belief that the act . . . was not injurious.”).
113. Id. at 385–86 (majority opinion) (holding that autoerotic asphyxiation is an injury, and, therefore, by 
engaging in the act, Llenos automatically had both subjective and objective expectation of an injury or 
even death); but see Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that in 
order to evaluate insurance proceeds for an accidental death, the court must first determine whether 
decedent had a subjective expectation of survival, and second, whether such expectation was objectively 
reasonable).
114. Santaella, 123 F.3d at 463.
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insurance proceeds should be paid, “it must be determined (1) that the deceased had 
a subjective expectation of survival, and (2) that such expectation was objectively 
reasonable, which it is if death is not substantially certain to result from the insured’s 
conduct.”115
 In Santaella, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the decedent’s death 
accidental not only because there was no subjective expectation of overdosing from 
the drug, but also because a reasonable person in her circumstances would not have 
considered death either “highly likely to occur” or “substantially certain to result” 
from her conduct.116
 In Todd, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated this standard by holding 
that looking to the decedent’s expectations is not a sufficient inquiry.117 The court 
reasoned further that the decedent’s expectation “must be reasonable,” explaining 
that an expectation is unreasonable if the risk of death is so high that the expectation 
of survival is simply unrealistic.118
 In Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Insurance Co. of Am., a 2004 autoerotic 
asphyxiation death case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also applied the two-
prong test found in Santaella and Todd.119 The Second Circuit stated:
We conclude . . . that this subjective/objective analysis ref lects the developing 
federal common law used in ERISA cases to determine whether a death, 
including a death during the practice of autoerotic asphyxiation, was, within 
the meaning of an ERISA-regulated insurance policy, either accidental or the 
result of an intentionally self-inflicted injury.120
 When considering the objective prong of the test, the Critchlow court concluded 
that the decedent’s expectation of survival was objectively reasonable because 
“autoerotic asphyxiation is not likely to result in death,” the decedent had practiced 
autoeroticism with nonlethal results before, and had set up an escape mechanism 
115. Id. (quoting Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995)).
116. Id.
117. See 47 F.3d at 1456 (“[T]he deceased’s expectation of survival, without more, is not enough . . . . That 
expectation must be reasonable . . . .”).
118. Id. (“[T]he expectation would be unreasonable if the conduct from which the insured died posed such a 
high risk of death that his expectation of survival was objectively unrealistic.”). The decedent in Todd 
died from autoerotic asphyxiation despite an elaborate escape mechanism. Id. at 1450. The Todd court 
stated that the decedent’s expectation of survival was reasonable, relying on scientific evidence and 
testimonies that characterized death from autoerotic asphyxiation as not a “normal expected result of 
the behavior.” Id. at 1457 (internal citations omitted):
[A]utoerotic . . . asphyxia . . . [is] the use of asphyxia to heighten sexual arousal, more 
often than not with a nonfatal outcome . . . . [E]xperts . . . testified that death from the 
practice would be considered unusual . . . [and] risk of death from autoerotic practice is 
‘not of such a nature that [the decedent] knew or should have known that it probably 
would result in death.
 Id.
119. 378 F.3d 246, 259 (2d Cir. 2004).
120. Id.
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that would save him in the event of loss of consciousness.121 Therefore, his subjective 
expectation of survival was objectively reasonable.122
 Here, the Tran court failed to confirm the reasonableness of the decedent’s 
expectations.123 Even assuming that the Tran court was right and Llenos subjectively 
expected to injure himself, that expectation may not have been objectively reasonable 
because, like the decedents in Todd and Critchlow, Llenos took prophylactic measures 
to mitigate the risk of injury and had a non-injurious history of autoerotic 
asphyxiation.124 Further, autoerotic asphyxiation, more often than not, results in 
heightened sexual arousal only, not death.125 There is no reason to believe that this 
would hold true for Todd and Critchlow but not for Llenos, when his cause of death 
was identical to theirs.126 Therefore, the court erred by not considering the objective 
prong of the subjective/objective test, because it did not assess the reasonableness of 
Llenos’s expectation of survival.127
 Finally, Llenos likely purchased the accidental death insurance precisely for the 
purpose of protecting himself from his own mistakes and miscalculations.128 
Accidental death insurance exists to protect its purchasers from fatal mistakes.129 
This is also why courts must inquire into the expectations of the insured in accidental 
death cases.130 That Llenos died as the result of a risky activity does not render his 
death intentional.131 By misapplying the subjective/objective test and, in turn, 
121. Id. at 260.
122. Id.
123. Tran v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 922 F.3d 380, 385–86 (7th Cir. 2019).
124. Id. at 388 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
125. See Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1457 (5th Cir. 1995) (summarizing scientific evidence and 
expert testimony to conclude that death from autoerotic asphyxiation is unusual).
126. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 381 (“Linno Llenos died engaging in an act known as autoerotic asphyxiation.”); 
see also Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 250 (“The coroner’s report concluded, and it is undisputed, that his death 
resulted from his practice of autoerotic asphyxiation . . . .”); see also Todd, 47 F.3d at 1450 (“The cause of 
death was determined to be autoerotic asphyxiation . . . .”).
127. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 385–86 (“Here, we need not reach the objective step in the analysis, because 
Llenos’s subjective intent was clear.”).
128. See Wickman v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1088 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Generally, insureds purchase 
accident insurance for the very purpose of obtaining protection from their own miscalculations and 
misjudgments.”).
129. See Burnham, supra note 50, at 611 (explaining that accidental death insurance was developed by 
insurance companies to attract customers with double coverage if death occurred as a result of an 
accident).
130. Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1088 (“[T]he reasonable expectations of the insured when the policy was 
purchased is the proper starting point for a determination of whether an injury was accidental under its 
terms.”).
131. Richmond, supra note 108 (“The fact that a person’s death was senseless or the product of foolhardy 
behavior or recklessness does not mean that it was nonaccidental.”).
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denying Tran her husband’s accidental death insurance proceeds, the Tran court 
invalidated the very purpose of that insurance.132
 Insurance companies have the ability to explicitly exclude those acts they do not 
intend to cover.133 Many insurance companies already exclude from coverage activities 
such as bungee jumping, motorcycle racing, skydiving, or mountain climbing.134 As 
the court in Todd and the dissent in Tran point out, life insurance companies could, 
if they wanted to, protect themselves from adverse judgments in autoerotic 
asphyxiation death cases.135 In deciding that Tran is not entitled to the insurance 
proceeds in this case, the Tran court remedied an ambiguity in the insurance policy 
that Minnesota Life should have remedied itself, all the while invalidating the very 
purpose of accidental death insurance and contributing to an existing circuit split 
regarding autoerotic asphyxiation deaths.136
 In summary, the Tran court erred when applying the subjective/objective test. 
First, it misapplied the subjective prong of the test by asking whether the decedent 
had a subjective expectation of injuring himself, and not whether he had a subjective 
expectation of survival.137 Next, the Tran court did not address the second prong of 
the test, which explores the reasonableness of the decedent’s expectations.138 In other 
words, the Tran court failed to apply the correct test adopted by the Seventh Circuit 
132. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 386 (“Llenos died from an ‘intentionally self-inf licted injury.’ Even assuming 
Llenos’s death were accidental, Tran is not entitled to AD&D coverage and an additional $60,000 
payment.”). In denying recovery, the Tran court also contributed to the existing lack of uniformity 
among federal jurisdictions dealing with autoerotic asphyxiation death cases under ERISA. See 
Burnham, supra note 50, at 629 (“A comparison of all the autoerotic death cases illustrates the 
inconsistent results that these cases provoked depending on the jurisdiction . . . . These erratic results 
can be attributed partly to the lack of uniformity in the tests the different courts use.”).
133. See Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1452 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The district court also observed 
. . . that it is the company’s burden clearly to exclude those acts it does not intend to cover, and that acts 
that are not expressly omitted or excluded are covered.”).
134. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 389 (Bauer, J., dissenting) (first quoting Johnson v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 716 
F.3d 813, 817 (4th Cir. 2013); and then quoting Kovach v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 587 F.3d 323, 336 (6th 
Cir. 2009)).
135. See id. (“Minnesota Life is in the best position to remedy . . . ambiguity by expressly excluding coverage 
for such inherently dangerous activities, as other insurance providers have done.”); see also Todd, 47 F.3d 
at 1457 (“The life insurance companies have ample ways to avoid judgments like this one.”).
136. See Tran, 922 F.3d at 389 (Bauer, J., dissenting); see also Burnham, supra note 50, at 629 (discussing the 
circuit split on autoerotic asphyxiation death cases).
137. See Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing decedent’s expectation 
of survival when he performed autoerotic asphyxiation); see also Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 
F.3d 456, 463–64 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing decedent’s expectation of survival when she took a dose of 
pain medication prescribed by a doctor); see also Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456 (discussing decedent’s expectation 
of survival when he performed autoerotic asphyxiation).
138. See Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 260 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing 
decedent’s objectively reasonable expectation of survival when the decedent died from autoerotic 
asphyxiation); see also Santaella, 123 F.3d at 463 (quoting Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456) (applying the objective 
prong of the subjective/objective test to a case where decedent died from taking a dose of pain medication 
prescribed by a doctor); see also Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456 (articulating the objective prong of the subjective/
objective test and applying it to an autoerotic asphyxiation case).
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in Santaella.139 In doing so, the Tran court determined that autoerotic asphyxiation 
falls within the insurance policy’s exclusion, when Minnesota Life should have 
expressly indicated such exclusion to begin with.140 The Tran court’s misapplication 
of the precedent contributed to a circuit split that continues to divide U.S. jurisdictions 
deciding otherwise identical cases.141 Further, it curbed the scope of accidental death 
insurance coverage, advancing the interests of insurance companies at the expense of 
families whose loved ones met an accidental death. More particularly, the court 
assigned responsibility for this unfortunate accident to the defenseless decedent, 
while leaving his mourning wife—already crushed by the weight of this rather 
intimate and humiliating tragedy—without proceeds from the accidental death 
insurance, duly paid by the decedent.
139. Tran, 922 F.3d at 387 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 389; see also Todd, 47 F.3d at 1452 n.3.
141. See Burnham, supra note 50, at 629.
